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THE CLEAN AIR ACT: CITIZEN SUITS, 
ATTORNEYS’ FEES, AND THE SEPARATE 
PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIREMENT 
Matthew Burrows* 
Abstract: The Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes citizen suits and empowers 
courts reviewing these suits to award attorneys’ fees whenever appro-
priate. For some courts, awarding attorneys’ fees to a CAA citizen plaintiff 
is appropriate whenever a plaintiff achieves some success on the merits. 
Other courts hold that such awards are appropriate only when the citizen 
plaintiff has served the public interest by bringing suit. This note argues 
that a CAA citizen plaintiff seeking attorneys’ fees should not be required 
to demonstrate that the suit served the public interest. Instead, courts 
should award attorneys’ fees whenever a plaintiff partially or wholly 
prevails on the merits of a CAA citizen suit. 
Introduction 
The Clean Air Act (CAA)1—the federal air pollution regulation 
statute—contains two sections that authorize citizen participation in 
CAA enforcement and implementation.2 Section 304 permits citizen 
suits against CAA violators.3 Section 307 allows citizen suits challenging 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions made pursuant to the 
CAA.4 Both sections vest discretion in the reviewing court to award at-
torneys’ fees to a citizen litigant whenever it determines that such 
award is “appropriate.”5 While the scope of the court’s fee-shifting dis-
cretion is broad, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is not “appropri-
ate” to award attorneys’ fees to a citizen plaintiff absent some degree of 
success on the merits.6 In addition, most courts hold that it is “appro-
priate” to award attorneys’ fees to a partially or wholly prevailing citizen 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2008–09. 
1 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000). 
2 Amy Semmel, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club: A Misinterpretation of the Clean Air Act’s At-
torneys’ Fees Provision, 12 Ecology L.Q. 399, 417 (1985); See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604, 7607. 
3 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 
4 Id. § 7607(d). 
5 Id. §§ 7404(d), 7607(f). 
6 Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 680 (1983). 
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plaintiff only where that plaintiff demonstrates to the satisfaction of the 
reviewing court that the citizen suit served the public interest.7 
 This Note discusses the propriety of the separate public interest 
requirement for citizen plaintiffs who partially or wholly prevail on the 
merits of a CAA citizen suit. Part I provides an overview of environ-
mental citizen suit statutes and the CAA and examines in detail the dis-
tinct features and objectives of the CAA’s citizen-suit provisions. Part II 
addresses the judicial practice of fee-shifting and explores the reasons 
that underlie Congress’s decision to authorize awards of attorneys’ fees 
in CAA citizen suits. Part III summarizes and scrutinizes the judge-made 
rule that a successful citizen plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees 
absent a separate showing that the public interest has been served. Fi-
nally, Part IV proposes that the separate public interest requirement be 
abolished in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees whenever a citizen plain-
tiff achieves some degree of success on the merits of a CAA citizen suit. 
I. Citizen Suits and the Clean Air Act 
A. Environmental Citizen Suits 
In the 1960s, citizens began seeking legal procedures to give 
them a role in environmental regulation.8 Specifically, citizens called 
for the statutory expansion of standing in environmental lawsuits.9 As 
a result of this movement, several states enacted citizen-suit statutes.10 
These state statutes provided a model on which other citizen-suit stat-
utes would be based.11 
Virtually every major federal environmental statute enacted 
since 1970 authorizes citizen suits.12 While there are differences in 
statutory language, substantive provisions, and the manner of judicial 
interpretation among the various federal environmental suit provisions, 
all seek to balance the interests of government, citizens, and regulated 
                                                                                                                      
7 See, e.g., Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007) [Pound II]; W. 
States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996). 
8 See Daniel Riesel, Environmental Enforcement: Civil and Criminal § 15.02[1] 
(2007). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.; see, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618, 2619 (2000); Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7604, 7607 (2000); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124 
(2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9659 (2000). 
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parties.13 Typically, citizen-suit provisions confer broad authority to “any 
person” to bring suit on his own behalf against a private or government 
entity alleged to have violated the substantive provisions of the underly-
ing statute,14 and may also authorize suits against a government agency 
charged with the implementation of the statute.15 Citizen-suit provi-
sions also authorize the reviewing court to award attorneys’ fees to citi-
zen plaintiffs, in some cases where they prevail or substantially prevail,16 
and in other cases whenever the court deems it appropriate.17 
B. The Clean Air Act 
 Congress’s first attempt at addressing air pollution was a measured 
one: it sought to encourage and assist state and local governments in 
combating the problem while still adhering to the notion that the pre-
vention and control of air pollution at its source was not the primary 
responsibility of the federal government.18 Accordingly, in 1963, Con-
gress passed the CAA.19 The Act required the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW)20 to provide scientific information to 
the states on the effects of various air pollutants, but did not require 
states to implement abatement programs based on these data.21 The 
1963 Act also empowered the Secretary of the HEW to investigate in-
terstate pollution sources, but only state and local governments could 
undertake any recommended abatement measures.22 Finally, the 1963 
Act vested in the Secretary of the HEW the power to take direct legal 
action to abate air pollution in instances where pollution endangered 
                                                                                                                      
13 Riesel, supra note 8, § 15.02[2]. 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607. 
16 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 1365(d). The Clean Water Act authorizes the reviewing 
court to award attorneys’ fees in a citizen suit to “any prevailing or substantially prevailing 
party.” Id. 
17 Riesel, supra note 8, § 15.02[2]; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f). The CAA au-
thorizes the reviewing court to award attorneys’ fees whenever it “determines that such 
award is appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f). 
18 Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63–64 (1975). 
19 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7467q). 
20 The HEW is now called the Department of Health and Human Services. 
21 Fredrick R. Anderson, Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Environ-
mental Protection: Law and Policy 158 (2nd ed. 1990). 
22 Id. 
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the public health or welfare.23 These powers so diffused responsibility 
that no effective enforcement efforts were ever brought.24 
Thus the 1963 CAA yielded little progress, largely because it re-
lied almost exclusively on voluntary state efforts to control air pollu-
tion.25 Subsequent acts and amendments to the CAA enlarged the fed-
eral government’s role in combating air pollution.26 But these legislative 
efforts also proved ineffective.27 Part of their failure was attributable to 
the difficult scientific and institutional problems that federal and state 
agencies faced; preparing implementation plans and enforcing air pollu-
tion standards were enormous tasks.28 
In response, Congress drastically overhauled the CAA through 
the enactment of the CAA Amendments of 1970.29 These Amendments 
essentially federalized the field of air pollution prevention.30 The avowed 
purpose of the Amendments was to “speed up, expand, and intensify 
the war against air pollution in the United States with a view to assuring 
that the air we breathe throughout the Nation is wholesome once 
again.”31 The CAA charged the EPA with effectuating this broad legisla-
tive mandate, tasking it with the issuance and enforcement of concrete 
rules and regulations to combat air pollution.32 
Congress amended the CAA in 1977 and again in 1990.33 As it 
now stands, the CAA provides the basic framework for regulation of air 
pollution in the United States.34 The Act uses four basic techniques to 
achieve this end: it creates the broad, basic regulatory system for con-
trol of the most commonly-produced and significant air pollutants by 
stationary (as opposed to mobile) sources; it sets specific, strict con-
gressional standards for across-the-board rollbacks of automobile and 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and 
Society 442 n.3 (2nd ed. 1998); see Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 
(1975). 
26 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 
992 (1965); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2000)). 
27 Plater et al., supra note 25, at 442. 
28 Anderson, Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 21, at 159. 
29 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000)). 
30 Anderson, Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 21, at 159. 
31 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5356. 
32 See Semmel, supra note 2, at 418. 
33 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977); Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). 
34 Anderson, Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 21, at 162. 
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truck tailpipe emissions; it establishes a system of “best-technology” 
emissions requirements; and it implements a technology-based strategy 
for regulating hazardous air pollutants.35 
C. Citizen Suits and the CAA 
The CAA represents a vision of administrative law that en-
courages citizen participation in the enforcement and implementa-
tion of public policy.36 Congress enacted the CAA Amendments of 
1970 in part because it had lost faith in the ability of government to 
enforce and comply with the substantive provisions of the CAA.37 Fur-
thermore, Congress had lost confidence in the EPA’s ability to im-
plement air pollution policy on behalf of the public.38 Accordingly, 
the CAA Amendments of 1970 included two provisions that authorize 
public involvement in CAA enforcement and implementation.39 
Section 304 permits “any person” to “commence a civil action 
on his own behalf.”40 Specifically, a citizen plaintiff can initiate an ac-
                                                                                                                      
35 Plater et al., supra note 25, at 442. 
36 Semmel, supra note 2, at 399. 
37 Id.; see S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436–39 (1970), as reprinted in Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 app. B at 723 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
38 Semmel, supra note 2, at 399. 
39 Id. at 399–400. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000). Section 304 states in pertinent part: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may com-
mence a civil action on his own behalf – (1) against any person (including (i) 
the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency 
to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) 
who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation 
has been repeated) or to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limi-
tation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a 
State with respect to such a standard or limitation, (2) against the Administra-
tor where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or 
duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator, or 
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or 
modified major emitting facility without a permit required under part C of 
subchapter I of this chapter (relating to significant deterioration of air qual-
ity) or part D of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to nonattainment) or 
who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation 
has been repeated) or to be in violation of any condition of such permit. 
 
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in 
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to per-
form such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil 
penalties (except for actions under paragraph (2)). The district courts of the 
United States shall have jurisdiction to compel (consistent with paragraph (2) 
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tion against any person alleged to be in violation of an emissions stan-
dard or limitation, or challenge an order issued by the EPA Administra-
tor or a state with respect to such a standard or limitation.41 A suit can 
also be filed against the EPA Administrator for failure to perform a 
nondiscretionary act.42 Finally, a suit can be brought against a person 
who builds or purposes to build a “new or modified major emitting fa-
cility” without a permit or in violation of the conditions of a permit.43 
 Section 307 authorizes private citizens to initiate review of certain 
EPA actions under specifically enumerated provisions of the CAA.44 
                                                                                                                      
of this subsection) agency action unreasonably delayed, except that an action 
to compel agency action referred to in section 7607(b) of this title which is 
unreasonably delayed may only be filed in a United States District Court 
within the circuit in which such action would be reviewable under section 
7607(b) of this title. In any such action for unreasonable delay, notice to the 
entities referred to in subsection (b)(1)(A) of this section shall be provided 
180 days before commencing such action. 
Id. 
41 Id. § 7404(a)(1). 
42 Id. § 7404(a)(2). 
43 Id. § 7404(a)(3). 
44 Id. § 7607(d). Section 307 authorizes private citizens to initiate review of the follow-
ing EPA actions: 
(A) the promulgation or revision of any national ambient air quality standard 
under section 7409 of this title, (B) the promulgation or revision of an im-
plementation plan by the Administrator under section 7410(c) of this title, 
(C) the promulgation or revision of any standard of performance under sec-
tion 7411 of this title, or emission standard or limitation under 7412(d) of 
this title, any standard under section 7412(f) of this title, or any regulation 
under section 7412(g)(1)(D) and (F) of this title, or any regulation under 
section 7412(m) or (n) of this title, (D) the promulgation or revision of any 
requirement for solid waste combustion under section 7429 of this title, (E) 
the promulgation or revision of any regulation pertaining to any fuel or fuel 
additive under section 7545 of this title, (F) the promulgation or revision of 
any aircraft emission standard under section 7571 of this title, (G) the prom-
ulgation or revision of any regulation under subchapter IV-A of this chapter 
(relating to control of acid deposition), (H) promulgation or revision of 
regulations pertaining to primary nonferrous smelter orders under section 
7419 of this title (but not including the granting or denying of any such or-
der), (I) promulgation or revision of regulations under subchapter VI of this 
chapter (relating to stratosphere and ozone protection), ( J) promulgation or 
revision of regulations under part C of subchapter I of this chapter (relating 
to prevention of significant deterioration of air quality and protection of visi-
bility), (K) promulgation or revision of regulations under section 7521 of this 
title and test procedures for new motor vehicles or engines under section 
7525 of this title, and the revision of a standard under section 7521(a)(3) of 
this title, (L) promulgation or revision of regulations for noncompliance pen-
alties under section 7420 of this title, (M) promulgation or revision of any 
regulations promulgated under section 7541 of this title (relating to warran-
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Additionally, section 307 permits citizen suits challenging “any other 
nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action” taken by 
the EPA under the CAA.45 Finally, citizens can initiate judicial review of 
certain EPA actions under other specifically enumerated provisions of 
the Act and of “any other final action . . . which is locally or regionally 
applicable.”46 
D. Authorization of CAA Citizen Suits: Legislative Intent 
1. Section 304 
 Congress authorized section 304 suits to bolster CAA enforce-
ment.47 Congress recognized that government necessarily lacks the 
manpower, techniques, and awareness to combat air pollution on its 
own in an efficient, effective manner.48 Indeed, governmental agencies 
may fail to act or themselves might be polluters.49 Congress viewed citi-
zens as useful instruments in identifying CAA violations and in bringing 
                                                                                                                      
ties and compliance by vehicles in actual use), (N) action of the Administra-
tor under section 7426 of this title (relating to interstate pollution abate-
ment), (O) the promulgation or revision of any regulation pertaining to con-
sumer and commercial products under section 7511b(e) of this title, (P) the 
promulgation or revision of any regulation pertaining to field citations under 
section 7413(d)(3) of this title, (Q) the promulgation or revision of any regu-
lation pertaining to urban buses or the clean-fuel vehicle, clean-fuel fleet, and 
clean fuel programs under part C of subchapter II of this chapter, (R) the 
promulgation or revision of any regulation pertaining to nonroad engines or 
nonroad vehicles under section 7547 of this title, (S) the promulgation or re-
vision of any regulation relating to motor vehicle compliance program fees 
under section 7552 of this title, (T) the promulgation or revision of any regu-
lation under subchapter IV-A of this chapter (relating to acid deposition), 
(U) the promulgation or revision of any regulation under 7511b(f) of this ti-
tle pertaining to marine vessels, and (V) such other actions as the Administra-
tor may determine. 
Id. 
45 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 
46 Id. 
47 Metro. Wash. Coal. for Clean Air v. Dist. of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA. 539 F.2d 1068, 1070 (5th Cir. 1976); S. Rep. 
No. 91-1196, at 436–39 (1970), as reprinted in Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 
F.2d 692 app. B at 723 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Semmel, supra note 2, at 417. 
48 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 36–38 (statement of Sen. Muskie), as reprinted in Train, 510 
F.2d app. B at 728. 
49 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (1st Cir. 1973); S. Rep. 
No. 91-1196, as reprinted in Train, 510 F.2d app. B at 724. 
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them to the attention of the courts and enforcement agencies.50 Ac-
cordingly, citizen suits would motivate governmental agencies to act on 
their nondiscretionary duties to bring enforcement and abatement 
proceedings.51 
There was, however, significant disagreement in Congress over 
the degree to which section 304 should broaden standing.52 Some ad-
vocated a provision that conferred virtually unlimited standing to en-
sure that private citizens could make meaningful contributions to the 
enforcement and implementation of air pollution policy.53 Congress 
intended that citizens not be “treated as nuisances or troublemakers 
but rather as welcome participants in the vindication of the environ-
mental interests,”54 and thus broad standing was needed to effectuate 
this goal.55 Others argued for strict limitations to standing in order to 
prevent a “multiplicity” of frivolous, harassing lawsuits that would frus-
trate enforcement and implementation of the Act and overburden 
the courts.56 Many in Congress feared that private citizens would chal-
lenge virtually every agency decision in executing the numerous 
complex duties and responsibilities imposed by the CAA.57 
In the end, the final version of section 304 effected a com-
promise between the two sides.58 The provision broadens standing by 
permitting “any person” to bring a citizen suit and by expressly remov-
ing jurisdictional barriers to citizens’ suits, such as amount in contro-
versy and diversity of citizenship.59 Section 304 circumscribes standing 
by limiting citizen suits to instances where the government or an al-
leged polluter has failed or refused to comply with the CAA’s substan-
tive provisions.60 Thus, section 304 suits can be brought only for viola-
                                                                                                                      
50 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 484 F.2d at 1337; S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436–39, as re-
printed in Train, 510 F.2d app. B at 727. 
51 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436–39, as reprinted in Train, 510 F.2d app. B at 723. 
52 Id., as reprinted in Train, 510 F.2d app. B at 727; Riesel, supra note 8, § 15.02[1]. 
53 Riesel, supra note 8, § 15.02[1]. 
54 Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
55 See id. 
56 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 36–38 (statement of Sen. Muskie), as reprinted in Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 app. B at 727 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
57 Id. at 726–27. 
58 Riesel, supra note 8, § 15.02[1]. 
59 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000); Carey, 535 F.2d at 172–73. 
60 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b); Carey, 535 F.2d at 173. Absent an environmental emergency, a 
citizen must provide sixty days’ notice to the Administrator, to the state in which the viola-
tion occurs, and to the alleged violator before initiating a suit. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b). This 
notice period gives the administrative enforcement office an opportunity to act on the 
alleged violation. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436–39 (1970), as reprinted in Train, 510 F.2d app. 
B at 724. Moreover, if the Administrator or state has “commenced and is diligently prose-
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tions of specific provisions of the Act or of specific provisions of the 
applicable implementation plan.61 
Congress believed that CAA enforcement was not a technical 
matter beyond the competence of the courts.62 Section 304 vested in 
the courts jurisdiction to enforce emission standards, limitations, or 
orders; to apply appropriate civil penalties; and to compel the EPA 
Administrator to perform nondiscretionary duties.63 In a section 304 
suit, then, the court would not be asked to substitute its own definitions 
and standards for those of the EPA.64 Instead, the standards would be 
the same whether enforcement were sought through administrative or 
citizen enforcement.65 Thus, citizens who bring actions under section 
304 must meet established, objective evidentiary standards, thereby 
eliminating the need for the court to reanalyze technological or other 
considerations at the enforcement stage.66 Furthermore, Congress’s 
view was that CAA rules and regulations contained sufficiently clear 
and specific guidelines to enable federal judges to direct compliance, 
especially since they could obtain necessary expert advice and assis-
tance to help guide them.67 
2. Section 307 
Congress authorized section 307 suits to aid in CAA implemen-
tation.68 The CAA tasked the EPA with issuing rules and regulations to 
effectuate the broad policy goals of the Act.69 Congress recognized the 
                                                                                                                      
cuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance,” the 
citizen suit cannot be heard. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B). That said, any person may inter-
vene in such a civil action being prosecuted by the government as a matter of right. 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B). 
61 Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605, 613 (2nd Cir. 1988). 
62 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436–39 (1970), as reprinted in Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 app. B at 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 
64 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436–39, as reprinted in Train, 510 F.2d app. B at 723. 
65 Id. at 724. 
66 Id. at 723. 
67 Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 173 (2nd Cir. 1976). Indeed, federal 
courts are called upon daily to resolve highly technical fields such as antitrust, patent, and 
admiralty. Id. at 174. 
68 Semmel, supra note 2, at 417; see Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 
1351, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that, while section 304 permits citizens to file CAA 
enforcement suits, section 307 was enacted to allow citizens to challenge the wisdom of 
EPA decisions made pursuant to the CAA). 
69 See Semmel, supra note 2, at 418. For instance, the EPA is required to publish a list of 
specific air pollutants which, in the Administrator’s judgment, contribute to air pollution 
and endanger the public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2000). Addition-
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unprecedented scale and complexity of the CAA, but also desired its 
speedy implementation and administration.70 By authorizing suits chal-
lenging EPA decisionmaking, Congress sought to enlist citizen partici-
pation in the development of identifiable standards of air quality and in 
the formulation of control measures to implement such standards.71 
Congress saw citizens as useful mechanisms for educating the court 
about complex regulatory issues.72 Indeed, citizens can bring to light 
certain factual information that other litigants might be unwilling or 
unable to raise.73 Citizens may also raise arguments that cause the court 
to examine or reexamine a legal issue.74 Finally, citizen suits may reveal 
inadequacies in existing air pollution policy.75 
 Like section 304, section 307 embodies a compromise: it confers 
broad standing while also circumscribing it to prevent undue interfer-
ence with government action. Section 307 guarantees broad rights of 
participation at all stages of the regulatory process to virtually any per-
son.76 Moreover, through section 307, participants are assured access to 
a regulatory docket of relevant studies, comments, and agency memo-
randa that may affect EPA decisionmaking.77 
 To limit standing, only final EPA actions are ripe for judicial re-
view.78 In so doing, Congress sought to limit section 307 judicial review 
to situations where the EPA’s deliberative process has been sufficiently 
final to demand compliance with its announced position.79 To inter-
vene where the Agency’s deliberative process is merely tentative may 
deny the EPA an opportunity to correct its own mistakes or to apply its 
                                                                                                                      
ally, the EPA is required to issue air quality criteria for each of these pollutants, and to 
prescribe primary and secondary national ambient air quality standards for that purpose. 
Id. §§ 7408(a)(2), 7409. 
70 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (1st Cir. 1973). 
71 See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436–39, as reprinted in Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
Train, 510 F.2d 692 app. B at 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
72 See Semmel, supra note 2, at 418. 
73 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d at 1358 (noting that, by permitting 
public interest groups as well as businesses to challenge EPA actions, section 307 opens 
“the Administrator’s actions to judicial scrutiny from a point of view widely divergent from 
that represented by the regulated interests”); Semmel, supra note 2, at 416. 
74 Semmel, supra note 2, at 416. 
75 Id. at 416–17. 
76 Anderson, Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 21, at 171. 
77 Id. 
78 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d at 1356. 
79 See Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525, 1531 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (quoting Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
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expertise.80 Moreover, such intervention leads to piecemeal review that 
is inefficient and may prove unnecessary upon completion of the ad-
ministrative process.81 
Adjudication of a section 307 suit imposes unique burdens on 
the reviewing court.82 In a section 304 suit, the court’s role is limited 
to determining whether a governmental entity or private party has 
violated the substantive provisions of the CAA.83 In a section 307 suit, 
however, the court must determine whether the EPA had the proper 
evidence and reasons for reaching a particular policy decision.84 
Thus, the court must evaluate the highly technical background in-
formation of the case and, in reaching its decision, weigh competing 
policy factors and conflicting public interests.85 
II. Attorneys’ Fees 
A. The “American Rule” 
 Under the traditional “American Rule,” a prevailing litigant ordi-
narily is not entitled to collect attorneys’ fees from the losing party.86 
The underlying justification for the “American Rule” is that because the 
outcome of litigation is uncertain, one should not be penalized merely 
for defending or prosecuting a lawsuit,87 and that many might be un-
justly discouraged from initiating legitimate lawsuits if the penalty for 
losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.88 Moreover, the 
time, expense, and difficulties of proof that arise in litigating the rea-
sonableness of attorneys’ fees are too burdensome for judicial admini-
stration.89 
 There are two common law exceptions to the “American Rule.”90 
One is where the court awards attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party as a 
punitive measure upon finding that the losing party acted in bad 
                                                                                                                      
80 See id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242 
(1990)). 
81 See id. 
82 See Semmel, supra note 2, at 415. 
83 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436–39 (1970), as reprinted in Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 app. B at 723–24 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
84 Semmel, supra note 2, at 415. 
85 See id. at 415, 418. 
86 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
87 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Semmel, supra note 2, at 403. 
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faith.91 The other is the “common benefit” exception, where the court 
may spread the cost of litigation to those persons benefiting from it.92 
 More often, however, exceptions to the “American Rule” are found 
in fee-shifting provisions of federal statutes.93 These provisions provide 
express authority for courts to require a party to pay the attorneys’ fees 
of another party.94 For most fee-shifting statutes, Congress relies heavily 
on private efforts to aid in the enforcement and implementation of 
public policy.95 Congress thus allows awards of attorneys’ fees to en-
courage citizen participation in the supervision and regulation of these 
public-policy areas.96 
B. Awards of Attorneys’ Fees Under the CAA: Legislative Intent 
Although neither section 304 nor section 307 authorizes the 
court to award damages to citizen plaintiffs,97 both sections contain pro-
visions that authorize the court to award attorneys’ fees “whenever . . . 
appropriate.”98 The CAA Amendments of 1970 address attorneys’ fees 
in Section 304(d).99 Section 307(f)—added to the Act as part of the 
CAA Amendments of 1977—is section 307’s fee-shifting provision.100 
Congress did not authorize awards of attorneys’ fees to reward 
plaintiffs for prevailing on the merits of a citizen suit.101 Rather, Con-
gress included the attorneys’ fees provisions to achieve two important 
                                                                                                                      
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Riesel, supra note 8, § 15.01. 
94 Id. Every major federal environmental statute that authorizes citizen suits also pro-
vides for awards of attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (2000); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (2000); Ocean 
Thermal Energy Conversion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124(d) (2000); Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (2000). 
95 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975). 
96 See id. 
97 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f). In a section 304 suit the reviewing court may levy 
civil fines. But any penalties are generally put into a special fund to finance air compliance 
and enforcement activities. Id. § 7604(g). The CAA also gives the courts limited discretion 
to direct up to $100,000 in penalties arising from a citizen suit to be spent on beneficial 
mitigation projects after obtaining the view of the Administrator. Id. 
98 Id. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f). Apparently as a result of congressional oversight, the 1970 
CAA Amendments authorized awards of attorneys’ fees under section 304 but not under 
section 307. Semmel, supra note 2, at 404 n.32. The 1977 CAA Amendments corrected this 
mistake by including section 307(f), which authorizes awards of attorneys’ fees for section 
307 citizen suits. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f). 
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d). 
100 See id. § 7607(f). 
101 Semmel, supra note 2, at 418. 
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goals.102 First, Congress sought to encourage citizens to bring meritori-
ous suits; second, Congress determined the risk that the court would 
order a citizen plaintiff to bear a defendant’s costs would discourage 
the filing of frivolous or harassing suits.103 
Congress viewed the authorization of attorneys’ fees as critical 
to ensuring robust citizen participation in CAA enforcement and im-
plementation.104 Absent the possibility of attorneys’ fees, many legiti-
mate section 304 enforcement suits would not be brought because, for 
many plaintiffs, the certainty of paying attorneys’ fees would outweigh 
the gain those plaintiffs would reap if they prevailed.105 Moreover, many 
litigants cannot be expected to participate in section 307 suits without 
the prospect of attorneys’ fees.106 Such fees offer the promise of miti-
gating the high costs of suits involving complex statutory questions.107 
In the 1970 Senate Report, Congress made clear its intent that 
attorneys’ fees be awarded under section 304 in a manner that both 
encouraged meritorious enforcement suits and discouraged frivolous 
ones.108 The Report states that, because citizens could not be awarded 
damages, “only in the case where there is a crying need for action will 
action in fact be likely. In such cases . . . that action must be in the 
public interest.”109 The Report further states that citizens who 
brought “legitimate actions” would be “performing a public service 
and in such instances courts should award costs of litigation.”110 At the 
same time, Congress made clear that the court could award attorneys’ 
fees to defendants whenever it “determines that such action is in the 
public interest.”111 Thus, the court could force a citizen plaintiff to 
bear the defendant’s attorneys’ fees where “litigation was obviously 
frivolous or harassing.”112 Congress’s belief was that awarding fees in 
                                                                                                                      
102 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (1st Cir. 1973). 
103 Id. at 1337–38; H.R. Rep. No. 95–294 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 
1416 (“[T]he purposes of the authority to award fees are . . . not only to discourage frivo-
lous litigation, but also to encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation 
and administration of the act . . . .”); see Metro. Wash. Coal. for Clean Air v. Dist. of Co-
lumbia, 639 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The attorneys’ fee feature was offered as an 
inducement to citizen-suits, which Congress deemed necessary . . . .”). 
104 See Metro. Wash. Coal. for Clean Air, 639 F.2d at 804. 
105 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 484 F.2d at 1337. 
106 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
107 See id. 
108 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 436–39 (1970), as reprinted in Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 app. B at 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
109 Id. at 729. 
110 Id. 725. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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this manner would have the effect of “discouraging abuse of [section 
304], while at the same time encouraging the quality of the actions 
that will be brought.”113 
 Congress likely intended courts to award fees under section 307(f) 
in the same manner.114 When Congress amended section 307 in 1977 
to authorize awards of attorneys’ fees, it adopted the same fee-shifting 
language as section 304.115 Furthermore, the 1977 Senate Report ob-
served that “[t]he purpose of the amendment to section 307 is to carry 
out the intent of the committee in 1970 that a court may, in its discre-
tion, award costs of litigation to a party bringing a suit under section 
307 of the Clean Air Act.”116 The 1977 House Report also notes: 
In the case of section 307 judicial review litigation, the pur-
poses of the authority to award fees are not only to discourage 
frivolous litigation, but also to encourage litigation which will 
assure proper implementation and administration of the act 
or otherwise serve the public interest. The committee did not 
intend that the court’s discretion to award fees under this 
provision should be restricted to cases in which the party seek-
ing fees was the “prevailing party.”117 
 That section 304(d) and section 307(f) should be given the same 
effect is intuitive, because Congress’s goal of combating air pollution is 
no less frustrated by improper implementation of the CAA than it is by 
lax enforcement.118 
III. Judicial Interpretation of the CAA’s Attorneys’  
Fees Provisions 
A. A Plain Language Reading of “Appropriate” 
 Both section 304(d) and section 307(f) give the court discretion to 
award attorneys’ fees “whenever . . . appropriate.”119 Courts have had 
difficulty, however, in drawing any guidance from these sections’ use of 
                                                                                                                      
113 Id. 
114 Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
115 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2000), with 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f). 
116 S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 99 (1977), quoted in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 
683 n.2 (1983). 
117 H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 337 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1416. 
118 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (1st Cir. 1973). 
119 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f). 
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the word “appropriate.”120 The word “appropriate” is necessarily am-
biguous, for its meaning is vague and subjective.121 As such, the scope 
of a reviewing court’s fee-shifting discretion is not self-evident by refer-
ence to the statutory text of the attorneys’ fees provisions.122 Conse-
quently, a variety of interpretations have emerged from case law regard-
ing when it is and is not appropriate to award attorneys’ fees. 
B. Some Success on the Merits 
 Soon after the enactment of the CAA Amendments of 1970, sev-
eral courts adjudicating CAA citizen suits implied that prevailing on 
the merits was a sufficient condition for an award of attorneys’ fees to 
be “appropriate.”123 Some courts went further, however, holding that 
whether a citizen plaintiff achieved some success on the merits of a 
citizen suit was not a necessary condition for such an award.124 In Met-
ropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, for ex-
ample, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia interpreted 
section 304(d) as authorizing awards of attorneys’ fees to a citizen 
plaintiff where the underlying suit was “of the type that Congress in-
tended to encourage when it enacted the citizen-suit provision.”125 
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia interpreted section 307(f) as authorizing awards of at-
                                                                                                                      
120 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 683. 
121 Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
122 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983). 
123 Id. at 14; see Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 484 F.2d at 1338 (holding that an award 
of attorneys’ fees was appropriate largely because plaintiffs were successful on the merits in 
several respects); Del. Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, 62 F.R.D. 353, 355 
(D. Del. 1974), aff’d, 510 F.2d 969 (3rd Cir. 1974) (noting that, in determining whether to 
award attorneys’ fees, “success or failure must be given substantial weight”). 
124 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Metro. Wash. Coal. 
for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
125 639 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In this case, a citizen suit was brought to enjoin 
the continued operation of a large solid waste incinerator that was operating in violation 
of an EPA approved implementation plan. Id. at 803. While the suit was being litigated, the 
EPA revised its implementation plan so as to permit the continued operation of the incin-
erator. Id. The case was subsequently dismissed as moot, and the court denied plaintiff’s 
request for attorneys’ fees because plaintiff had not achieved any success on the merits. Id. 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit examined the legislative history of section 304 and found that 
Congress had authorized section 304 suits to enable citizen participation in CAA enforce-
ment. Id. at 804. The court thus reasoned that an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate 
where the underlying suit was “a desirable effort to achieve an unfulfilled objective of the 
Act.” Id. 
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torneys’ fees to a citizen plaintiff who, by bringing suit, has contrib-
uted substantially to the goals of the CAA.126 
 In Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, however, the Supreme Court re-
versed Gorsuch, and held that, absent some degree of success on the 
merits, it is never “appropriate” to award attorneys’ fees to a CAA citi-
zen plaintiff under either section 304 or section 307.127 The Court 
reasoned that the “American Rule” largely prohibits awarding attor-
neys’ fees to a party, and thus only a clear showing that Congress in-
tended a departure from the “American Rule” would justify awarding 
attorneys’ fees to wholly unsuccessful plaintiffs.128 The Court found 
that Congress’s decision to reject the “prevailing party” standard in 
favor of the broader “whenever . . . appropriate” standard showed 
clear intent to broaden the class of parties eligible for fee awards from 
prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties.129 That said, the Court 
found no evidence that Congress intended the class of parties eligible 
for such awards to be so broad as to include parties who achieved no 
success whatsoever.130 While the Court’s holding applied to section 
307(f) of the CAA, the Court noted that “the interpretation of ‘ap-
propriate’ in section 307(f) controls construction of the term” in sec-
tion 304(d) as well as in all other statutes that contain the “whenever 
. . . appropriate” standard.131 
                                                                                                                      
126 672 F.2d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 942 (1982), rev’d, Ruckelshaus, 
463 U.S. 680 (1983), remanded to 716 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In this case, the Sierra Club 
and the Environmental Defense Fund unsuccessfully challenged EPA regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the CAA. Id. at 34. Nevertheless, plaintiffs moved for an award of attor-
neys’ fees. Id. The D.C. Circuit made clear that whether an award of attorneys’ fees was 
“appropriate” turned heavily on whether the citizen plaintiff had achieved some success on 
the merits. See id. at 35. But of equal concern was whether the citizen suit contributed to 
the goals of the CAA. Id. at 38. The court found it appropriate to award fees to the citizen 
plaintiffs because they had contributed to the goals of the CAA by addressing important, 
complex, and novel issues of statutory interpretation; by substantially assisting in the reso-
lution of the issues in a way that was not duplicative of the efforts of other parties; and by 
putting forth written and oral presentations of exceptional caliber. Id. at 39. 
127 463 U.S. 680, 680 (1983). 
128 Id. at 685. 
129 Id. at 689–90. 
130 See id. at 690. 
131 Id. at 681 n.1. 
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C. The Separate Public Interest Requirement 
1. In General 
 A majority of courts hold that, in addition to achieving some suc-
cess on the merits, a citizen plaintiff must also make a separate showing 
of serving the public interest before an award of attorneys’ fees is “ap-
propriate.”132 To be sure, the original version of section 304(d) actually 
authorized the reviewing court to award attorneys’ fees whenever it de-
termined that such award was “in the public interest.”133 In fact, it was 
this version of section 304—and not the final version—that was reported 
on in the 1970 Senate Report.134 However, the “public interest” lan-
guage was expressly struck from section 304(d) in 1970 in favor of the 
“whenever . . . appropriate” language.135 The 1977 House Report also 
mentions the public interest factor.136 Still, nowhere in the statutory text 
or legislative history of the CAA is the term “public interest” defined.137 
2. Judicial Interpretation and Application of the Separate Public 
Interest Requirement 
 While the separate public interest requirement has little basis in 
the statutory text or legislative history of the CAA, courts routinely em-
ploy it to determine whether it is “appropriate” to award attorneys’ fees 
to a partially or wholly successful citizen plaintiff.138 Not surprisingly, 
several amorphous standards and methods have emerged from case law 
for determining whether a partially or wholly successful citizen plaintiff 
has served the public interest. One such standard focuses on the out-
come of the litigation, awarding attorneys’ fees where the citizen suit 
                                                                                                                      
132 See, e.g., Pound II, 498 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007); W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. 
EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796, 799–800 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
133 Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 12 n.25, 18 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., 
dissenting). 
134 Id. at 12 n.25. 
135 Id. at 18. 
136 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 337 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1416 
(“[T]he purposes of the authority to award fees are not only to discourage frivolous litiga-
tion, but also to encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation and admini-
stration of the act or otherwise serve the public interest.” (emphasis added)). 
137 Ala. Power Co., 672 F.2d at 18 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
138 See, e.g., Pound II, 498 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007); W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. 
EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796, 799–800 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
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assisted in the enforcement or implementation of the CAA.139 This 
standard generally prohibits awarding attorneys’ fees where the bene-
fits conferred in the litigation were limited to the citizen plaintiff in the 
underlying suit.140 
 For example, under section 304, litigation compelling a govern-
ment agency to exercise its nondiscretionary duties and successfully 
enforcing a provision of the CAA in a way that minimizes the amount 
of pollution in the atmosphere has been held to meet this standard.141 
Under section 307, litigation that aided in interpreting important, 
complex, or novel issues related to the CAA has been held to have 
served the public interest.142 
 Another standard for determining whether a partially or wholly 
successful citizen plaintiff has served the public interest focuses more 
on whether the citizen suit was the type of suit that Congress sought to 
encourage by authorizing awards of attorneys’ fees.143 This standard 
focuses less on the effect of the litigation and more on the nature of 
the suit itself, the type of litigant filing suit, and the ostensible motives 
for doing so.144 
 For instance, some courts have held that it is not appropriate to 
award attorneys’ fees to successful citizen plaintiffs that are not pro-
environment, that is, industry, trade association, or corporate citizen 
plaintiffs.145 Neither section 304 nor section 307 explicitly denies 
awards of attorneys’ fees to such groups.146 But courts that limit awards 
of attorneys’ fees to pro-environment citizen plaintiffs have stated or 
implied that Congress authorized awards of attorneys’ fees to encour-
age litigation by “watchdog” or public-interest groups whose involve-
                                                                                                                      
139 See, e.g., Ala. Power Co., 672 F.2d at 3 (noting that, in determining whether to award 
attorneys’ fees, the “dominant consideration” is not whether the party has prevailed but 
rather whether the litigation “has served the public interest by assisting the interpretation 
or implementation of the Clean Air Act”). 
140 See id. 
141 See Pound II, 498 F.3d 1089, 1102. 
142 See generally Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (concerning 
the citizen suit provision of TSCA, whose fee-shifting language is nearly identical to that of 
the CAA). The court found that an award of attorneys’ fees was appropriate because the 
citizen plaintiff, by filing suit, had brought to bear “critically important and difficult issues 
of first impression, and that the outcome of the litigation greatly served the public interest 
. . . .” Id. at 55. 
143 See W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996). 
144 See id. 
145 See, e.g., Pound v. Airosol Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1247 (D.Kan. 2006) [Pound I], 
rev’d, 498 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2007); W. States Petroleum Ass’n, 87 F.3d at 280. 
146 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (2000). 
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ment in such litigation was motivated by altruism and public spirit.147 
Awarding attorneys’ fees to pro-environment citizen plaintiffs is needed 
because, absent the prospect of an award of attorneys’ fees, these plain-
tiffs may not have sufficient financial resources to file suit.148 
A circuit split exists regarding whether it is appropriate to 
award attorneys’ fees where a citizen plaintiff has brought suit for fi-
nancial gain rather than to further the goals of the CAA.149 In Western 
States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, for instance, the Ninth Circuit declined to 
award attorneys’ fees to a citizen plaintiff who prevailed on the merits 
of a section 307 suit because plaintiff was a financially able, nongov-
ernmental body who filed suit to advance its own economic inter-
ests.150 In that case, the court cited the legislative history of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA)151—whose citizen-suit provision uses 
the same fee-shifting language as the CAA152—as the clearest expres-
sion of Congress’s intent in authorizing attorneys’ fees in environ-
mental citizen-suit statutes.153 During the debate on TSCA’s fee-
shifting provision, Senator Magnuson stated: 
It is not the intention of these provisions to provide an award 
for an individual or group if that individual or a group may 
stand to gain significant economic benefits through participa-
tion in the proceeding . . . . It is not intended that the provi-
sions support participation of persons, including corporations 
or trade associations, that could otherwise afford to partici-
pate . . . . Whether or not the person’s resources are sufficient 
to enable participation would include consideration of . . . the 
                                                                                                                      
147 See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 1982). 
148 See id. at 942–43. 
149 Compare W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996), and Ala. 
Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1982), with Pound II, 498 F.3d at 1102  (10th 
Cir. 2007), and Fla. Power & Light Co., 683 F.2d at 942. 
150 87 F.3d at 286. 
151 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2000). 
152 Compare id. § 2618(d) (“The decision of the court in an action commenced under 
subsection (a) of this section . . . may include an award of costs of suit and reasonable fees 
for attorneys and expert witnesses if the court determines that such an award is appropri-
ate.”), with 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (“In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court 
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) 
whenever it determines that such award is appropriate.”). 
153 W. States Petroleum Ass’n, 87 F.3d at 286. 
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likelihood that the person would seek to participate in the 
proceedings whether or not compensation was available.154 
 Based on these remarks, the court concluded that Congress nei-
ther intended to subsidize all CAA litigation nor contemplated that 
costs and fees would be awarded to large, solvent corporations or trade 
associations that, out of their own substantial economic interests, would 
have litigated anyway.155 
 Other courts have rejected the notion that financial solvency and 
economic interest are bases for declining attorneys’ fees to citizen 
plaintiffs who partially or wholly prevail.156 In Florida Power & Light Co. 
v. Costle, for example, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the statutory text 
and legislative history of the CAA do not support the notion that fi-
nancial solvency and economic interest should disqualify a citizen 
plaintiff from an award of attorneys’ fees.157 In that case, a financially 
solvent corporation filed a section 307 suit challenging an EPA action 
that required Florida to incorporate a state-imposed two-year limita-
tion on relief into a state implementation plan.158 The court ruled in 
favor of the citizen plaintiff, holding that the EPA action constituted 
an abuse of discretion, and plaintiff moved for an award of attorneys’ 
fees.159 The court found that the citizen plaintiff had served the pub-
lic interest by helping to maintain “the balance of state and federal 
responsibilities that undergird the efficacy of the Clean Air Act.”160 
The EPA, however, argued that Congress did not intend to award at-
torneys’ fees to financially solvent citizen plaintiffs who file suit out of 
an underlying economic motivation.161 The court, noting that the 
EPA’s argument was persuasive as a matter of public policy, nonethe-
less rejected it on grounds that it was not supported by the CAA’s 
statutory language or legislative history.162 
 Furthermore, in Pound v. Airosol Co. (Pound II ), the Tenth Circuit 
rejected using financial solvency and economic motive as bases for de-
clining to award attorneys’ fees—reasoning that doing so would consti-
                                                                                                                      
154 112 Cong. Rec. 32,855 (1976) (statement of Sen. Magnuson), quoted in W. States Pe-
troleum Ass’n, 87 F.3d at 286. 
155 W. States Petroleum Ass’n, 87 F.3d at 286. 
156 See, e.g., Fla. Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1982). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 942. 
160 Id. (quoting Fla. Power & Light v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579, 589 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
161 Id. 
162 Fla. Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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tute bad public policy.163 In that case, a financially solvent company 
prevailed on the merits of a section 304 citizen suit against a business 
competitor that was violating the CAA’s ban on certain aerosols.164 The 
lower court, applying the public interest requirement, held that the 
citizen plaintiff was not entitled to attorneys’ fees because plaintiff had 
brought suit out of a desire to remove a business competitor from the 
market and not out of concern for the environment.165 The Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed, reasoning that the citizen plaintiff had served the public 
interest by minimizing the amount of pollution in the atmosphere and 
argued that the lower court’s interpretation of section 304(d) would 
weaken CAA enforcement.166 The court noted that “competitors are 
most likely to have a substantial financial interest in ensuring that their 
peers are CAA compliant, and they are the most informed regarding 
products offered and sold by their peers.”167 Implicit in the court’s rea-
soning is the notion that without the prospect of an award of attorneys’ 
fees, many legitimate citizen suits against ongoing polluters would not 
be brought.168 
3. Judicial Resistance to the Separate Public Interest Requirement 
Some judges have sought to abandon the separate public inter-
est requirement entirely.169 In Pound, Judge Hartz, writing in concur-
rence, argued that the separate public interest requirement was a su-
perfluity that ought to be discarded.170 Judge Hartz advocated 
following the rule set out by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
which is that a prevailing party should ordinarily recover attorneys’ fees 
unless the citizen suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or 
embarrass the defendant.171 Hensley involved the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976, whose citizen-suit fee-shifting language is 
nearly identical to that of the CAA.172 Judge Hartz argued that the at-
                                                                                                                      
163 See 498 F.3d 1089, 1102–03 (10th Cir. 2007). 
164 Id. at 1094. 
165 Pound I, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1247 (D.Kan. 2006), rev’d, 498 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 
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167 Id. at 1102. 
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torneys’ fees provisions of the CAA and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Awards Act should be interpreted in a similar manner because Con-
gress enacted them for the same reason: to promote citizen enforce-
ment of important federal policies.173 
 Similarly, in Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, Judge Wilkey—in a dis-
senting opinion—argued that the legislative history of the CAA re-
quires that a prevailing citizen litigant be awarded attorneys’ fees.174 
Citing the 1970 Senate Report, which urged judges to award fees for 
those who bring “legitimate actions,” Judge Wilkey argued that a party 
who prevails on the merits of a non-frivolous citizen suit has necessarily 
brought a legitimate action and thus is entitled to attorneys’ fees.175 
Moreover, Congress’s decision to adopt section 304(d)’s language for 
section 307(f) evidenced its intent to award attorneys’ fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs.176 Furthermore, the 1977 House Report makes clear that the 
“committee did not intend that the court’s discretion to award fees . . . 
should be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees was the 
‘prevailing party.’”177 He argued that while it is unclear whether wholly 
non-prevailing citizen plaintiffs can recover attorneys’ fees, it is clear 
from this language that Congress intended to award attorneys’ fees to 
partially or wholly successful citizen plaintiffs.178 
IV. Analysis 
No separate public interest showing should be required of a 
plaintiff who seeks an award of attorneys’ fees after partially or wholly 
prevailing on the merits of a CAA citizen suit.179 Such a requirement 
is unrelated to the statute’s text or to its legislative history.180 More-
over, there is no judicially cognizable standard for determining 
whether an underlying citizen suit served the public interest, causing 
                                                                                                                      
der in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may award costs of 
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173 Pound II, 498 F.3d at 1103 (Hartz, J., concurring). 
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178 Ala. Power Co., 672 F.2d at 13–14 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
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courts to create their own standards out of thin air.181 Additionally, 
the separate public interest requirement should be rejected because it 
has a chilling effect on citizen participation in CAA enforcement and 
implementation.182 In lieu of the separate public interest require-
ment, courts should simply award attorneys’ fees whenever a citizen 
plaintiff achieves some degree of success on the merits of a CAA citi-
zen suit.183 
A. The Statutory Text and Legislative History of the CAA Do Not Support the 
Separate Public Interest Requirement 
The requirement that a partially or wholly successful citizen 
plaintiff make a separate public interest showing before an award of 
attorneys’ fees is “appropriate” has no basis in the statutory text or leg-
islative history of the CAA.184 While the original version of section 
304(d) did embody the public interest factor, Congress expressly struck 
this phrase from the final version in favor of the “appropriate” lan-
guage.185 Section 307(f) adopted identical language.186 This, of course, 
does not conclusively evidence that Congress did not intend for a sepa-
rate public interest requirement, but it certainly does not evidence that 
it did.187 And while the 1970 Senate Report and 1977 House Report do 
mention serving the “public interest” on a handful of occasions, they 
do so primarily to highlight the fact that attorneys’ fees can be awarded 
both to citizen plaintiffs and to citizen defendants.188 
Still, Congress’s decision to authorize awards of attorneys’ fees 
“whenever . . . appropriate” arguably evidences a Congressional en-
dorsement of the separate public interest requirement. After all, this 
language is unlike the fee-shifting language of other environmental 
statutes, which authorize the court to award attorneys’ fees to parties 
who “prevail” or “substantially prevail.”189 Had Congress intended pre-
vailing on the merits to be a sufficient condition for an award of attor-
neys’ fees it plainly would have said so in the statute. 
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But the CAA’s unique fee-shifting language reflects Congress’s 
intent to expand—not limit—the class of parties eligible for attorneys’ 
fees.190 As the 1970 Senate Report notes, the CAA’s broad fee-shifting 
language was intended to give the court discretion to award attorneys’ 
fees not only to plaintiffs, but also to defendants against whom a citi-
zen suit was brought for frivolous or harassing reasons.191 Further-
more, the 1977 House Report states, “The committee did not intend 
that the court’s discretion to award fees under this provision should 
be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees” was the prevailing 
party.192 At a minimum, then, Congress intended that the class of par-
ties entitled to attorneys’ fees be broad enough to include prevailing 
or partially prevailing parties.193 
There is some persuasive evidence indicating that Congress in-
tended for a separate public interest requirement.194 As the Ninth Cir-
cuit noted in Western States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, the legislative history 
of TSCA195 suggests that, in general, Congress did not intend to award 
fees to plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits who filed suit only out of 
their own self-interest.196 Senator Magnuson remarked that Congress 
did not intend to subsidize citizen suits commenced by solvent parties 
who, due to their own substantial economic interest in the underlying 
suit, would have litigated anyway.197 He argued that, in determining 
whether to award attorneys’ fees, the court should look to the “likeli-
hood that the [plaintiff] would seek to participate in the proceeding 
whether or not compensation was available.”198 
But TSCA and CAA are different statutes, and what is appropri-
ate under one statute is not necessarily appropriate under another.199 
Indeed, Senator Magnuson was not involved with the enactment of ei-
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ther section 304(d) or section 307(f), and thus his comments have little 
bearing on the proper interpretation of these provisions.200 
Moreover, there is no need to reference TSCA or its legislative 
history because the legislative history of the CAA makes clear that Con-
gress viewed prevailing on the merits of a citizen suit and serving the 
public interest as one and the same.201 In the 1970 Senate Report, 
Congress noted that, because the CAA does not authorize awards of 
damages to successful citizen plaintiffs, only where there is a “crying 
need for action will action in fact be likely.”202 In such instances that 
action “must be in the public interest.”203 The Report also stated that a 
citizen plaintiff who brings a legitimate action necessarily has per-
formed “a public service and in such instances the courts should award 
costs of litigation.”204 Although what constitutes a legitimate action is 
unclear, it seems logical that a citizen plaintiff who prevails on the mer-
its has brought a suit that is both legitimate and non-frivolous.205 
In addition, Congress’s decision to adopt section 304(d)’s fee-
shifting language for section 307(f) further evidences that Congress did 
not intend for a separate public interest showing.206 In the years follow-
ing the CAA Amendments of 1970, several courts deciding cases under 
section 304 implied that prevailing on the merits was sufficient for an 
award of attorneys’ fees to be “appropriate.”207 When Congress enacted 
section 307(f) in 1977, it presumably was aware of these cases.208 In 
choosing to adopt section 304(d)’s language for section 307(f), Con-
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gress likely approved of that statutory interpretation.209 Moreover, it 
probably intended that section 307(f) be given the same effect.210 
B. The Separate Public Interest Requirement Lacks a Judicially  
Cognizable Standard 
Even if Congress intended for—or at least would not have ob-
jected to—a separate public interest requirement, the requirement 
should still be abandoned because there is no judicially cognizable 
standard for determining whether a citizen plaintiff has served the pub-
lic interest.211 Typically, courts can look to statutory text, legislative his-
tory, or some other source to glean a judicially cognizable standard.212 
But traditional gloss does not make clear what standard—if any— 
should control.213 In determining whether a successful citizen plaintiff 
has served the public interest, then, courts must define the types of liti-
gants, suits, and motives that are worthy of attorneys’ fees.214 This proc-
ess has yielded a number of amorphous case-law standards as well as a 
circuit split.215 It remains unclear which of these standards should ap-
ply, how they should be applied, and the extent to which they relate to 
one another.216 
Additionally, courts contravene the principle of separation of 
powers by creating their own public interest standards.217 Where the 
separate public interest requirement is imposed, prevailing on the mer-
its of a CAA citizen suit does not necessarily equate to aiding in the en-
forcement or implementation of public policy.218 Thus, in order to de-
termine whether a prevailing citizen plaintiff has served the public 
interest, a court must craft an independent definition of what consti-
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tutes good public policy.219 It must then create a standard for determin-
ing whether the underlying suit was consistent with its definition.220 But 
defining good public policy is the role of Congress, not the courts.221 By 
creating their own public interest standards, courts unduly encroach on 
legislative ground.222 
In practice, the separate public interest requirement leads to 
inconsistent judicial rulings.223 Application of any particular public in-
terest standard requires the court to look beyond the suit itself “into 
the heart of the petitioner,” in deciding whether the petitioner is wor-
thy of an award.224 Consequently, the scope of the court’s fee-shifting 
discretion has no clear contours, enabling the court to award or not 
award attorneys’ fees to successful citizen plaintiffs on myriad bases or 
on no basis whatsoever. 
The circuit split regarding whether it is “appropriate” to award 
attorneys’ fees to a citizen plaintiff whose decision to litigate a section 
304 suit was motivated by a substantial economic interest provides a 
useful illustration. Where courts use economic motive as the public in-
terest standard, an award of attorneys’ fees is prohibited for “a tenant 
farmer who seeks to stop a nearby factory from polluting his water sup-
ply,” but not for “his amateur fisherman brother-in-law who visits him 
on weekends.”225 This standard—like all independent public interest 
standards—is incoherent, because the citizen plaintiff must have 
enough interest in the litigation to establish standing but not so much 
that he becomes ineligible for attorneys’ fees.226 
It could be that the public interest is served where the underly-
ing citizen suit is consistent with public law.227 But if this standard con-
trols, it seems that the public interest standard is the same as the pre-
vail/not prevail standard—for, as a matter of valid public law, a non-
prevailing party has lost and a prevailing party has won.228 Further-
more, Congress’s avowed purpose for authorizing citizen suits was to 
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spur government enforcement and to aid in CAA implementation.229 
Thus, a completely unsuccessful citizen suit has not advanced these 
goals, while a partially or wholly successful plaintiff has.230 
 Another possibility is that the public interest is served where the 
underlying suit is consistent with valid public policy.231 But this standard, 
too, is tantamount to the prevail/not prevail standard.232 In authorizing 
CAA citizen suits, Congress opted to rely heavily on private participation 
in the enforcement and implementation of federal air pollution pol-
icy.233 Congress has given courts jurisdiction to adjudicate citizen suits 
and has directed them to award attorneys’ fees in a manner that ad-
vances the CAA’s goals and purposes.234 Where a citizen plaintiff 
achieves some success on the merits, he has prevailed on public policy 
determinations that Congress has authorized the courts to make.235 The 
plaintiff, therefore, has aided in the proper enforcement or implemen-
tation of public policy as enumerated by Congress by bringing a suit 
consistent with Congress’s definition of what good public policy is.236 
C. The Separate Public Interest Requirement Is Superfluous 
 The separate public interest requirement is wholly superfluous be-
cause a citizen plaintiff necessarily serves the public interest by partially 
or wholly prevailing on the merits of a CAA citizen suit.237 Section 304’s 
limitations to standing, for instance, ensure that a successful citizen 
plaintiff has served the public interest by aiding in CAA enforcement.238 
Congress authorized section 304 suits to bolster CAA enforcement, but 
concerns abounded that authorizing such suits would cause a spate of 
citizen litigation that would interfere with governmental enforcement of 
the Act.239 Accordingly, section 304 limits standing largely to specific 
instances where the government has failed or declined to enforce or 
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comply with the CAA.240 Thus, a citizen plaintiff establishes standing 
only by identifying and bringing to the reviewing court’s attention an 
unaddressed or uncorrected CAA violation.241 Where that plaintiff 
achieves at least some success on the merits, he or she necessarily serves 
the public interest by remedying an unfulfilled objective of the Act.242 
 Similarly, a separate public interest requirement is unnecessary 
under section 307 because that section’s limitations on standing guar-
antee that a citizen plaintiff who achieves some success on the merits 
has served the public interest by assisting in CAA implementation. Un-
der section 307, citizens may only challenge EPA actions that constitute 
final actions, for example, actions that represent the EPA’s definitive 
position on an area of air pollution policy.243 Where a citizen plaintiff 
prevails on the merits of a section 307 suit, he has demonstrated to the 
satisfaction of the reviewing court that a particular EPA action did not 
comport with the purposes and goals of the CAA.244 The plaintiff has 
thus aided in correcting an EPA action that did not properly imple-
ment Congress’s legislative mandate.245 And because the reviewing 
court’s decision implicates public law and public policy, the beneficiar-
ies of this correction include the public as well as the citizen plaintiff.246 
D. The Separate Public Interest Requirement Constitutes Bad Public Policy 
 There are valid public policy arguments in favor of requiring a 
separate public interest showing. Principally, the separate public inter-
est requirement gives the court latitude to limit an award of attorneys’ 
fees to citizen plaintiffs whose decision to litigate was motivated by pub-
lic spirit.247 These plaintiffs are more likely to need the financial incen-
tive of fee awards in order to pursue litigation.248 No additional en-
couragement is needed, however, for citizen plaintiffs whose decision to 
litigate was motivated by pure self-interest.249 The separate public inter-
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est requirement thus enables the court to avoid gratuitous awards of 
attorneys’ fees.250 
 But an award of attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff who achieves some 
success on the merits of a CAA citizen suit is hardly gratuitous. Where 
the defendant is a private polluter, for instance, an award of attorneys’ 
fees rightly forces the defendant to internalize a portion of the societal 
costs caused by the pollution.251 Where the defendant is a governmen-
tal entity, for example the EPA, an award of attorneys’ fees is also justi-
fied. By enacting the CAA, Congress tasked the EPA with implementing 
and supervising air pollution control.252 The EPA—as well as other gov-
ernmental entities bound by EPA rules and regulations promulgated 
pursuant to the CAA—handles public funds appropriated for that pur-
pose.253 Awarding attorneys’ fees to a successful citizen plaintiff where 
the defendant is the EPA or some other government body is to spread 
those costs among the taxpaying public—which receives the benefits of 
the litigation.254 
 In addition, a separate public interest requirement constitutes bad 
pubic policy because it has a chilling effect on CAA citizen participa-
tion.255 Admittedly, many citizen plaintiffs who file suit out of pure self-
interest would have done so absent the prospect of attorneys’ fees. But 
this will not always be the case.256 If the petitioner already has an incen-
tive to sue, the promise of an award of fees will offer an additional in-
centive and will “alter the decisionmaker’s calculus of whether to sue or 
not.”257 Indeed, just because some incentive to litigate exists does not 
mean that enough exists without attorneys’ fees for the suit to be 
brought.258 
 A reduction in citizen participation weakens CAA enforcement.259 
Citizens are often in the best position to identify CAA violations and to 
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bring them to the attention of courts and enforcement agencies.260 A 
private polluter, however, likely has a financial incentive to continue 
polluting and to defend against a citizen suit.261 Similarly, a governmen-
tal entity that fails to bring nondiscretionary enforcement actions likely 
has an incentive to remain inactive. Absent robust citizen participation, 
CAA violators who might otherwise be ordered to comply with the CAA 
will continue polluting, and government entities that might otherwise 
be found in dereliction of duty and compelled to act will remain inert. 
By weakening CAA enforcement, the separate public interest require-
ment undermines the central public policy rationale for authorizing 
section 304 suits—to persuade regulated parties not to pollute and to 
motivate government action.262 
 Diminished citizen participation also weakens CAA implementa-
tion.263 Under the CAA, the EPA is required to issue rules and regula-
tions in a manner that effectuates the broad policy goals of the Act.264 
But the development of identifiable standards of air quality and the 
formulation of control measures to implement such standards are on-
erous tasks.265 Citizen participation in section 307 suits is therefore 
critical to proper implementation of the CAA.266 Without vigorous citi-
zen participation, important suits, factual information, and legal argu-
ments will not be brought to the attention of the courts.267 Moreover, 
section 307 suits implicate public law, and thus the outcome of a sec-
tion 307 suit affects absentee interests as well as those of the citizen 
plaintiff.268 Therefore, when a section 307 suit is brought, diminished 
citizen participation impairs the reviewing court’s ability to make a bal-
anced, fully-informed ruling.269 
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Conclusion 
 The requirement that a successful citizen plaintiff make a separate 
public interest showing before being awarded attorneys’ fees is errone-
ous. It is inconsistent with Congress’s intent that citizens who bring 
meritorious actions be awarded attorneys’ fees. It is also decidedly un-
necessary, because a citizen plaintiff who partially or wholly prevails on 
the merits of a CAA citizen suit necessarily has served the public inter-
est. Moreover, the public policy benefits of the separate public interest 
requirement do not justify the chilling effect it has on citizen participa-
tion in CAA enforcement and implementation. 
